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Junior coalition parties in the British context: explaining 
the Liberal Democrat collapse at the 2015 general election 
Craig Johnson1 and Alia Middleton2 
The Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2015 general election provides an opportunity to 
examine the only case in the post-war period of a national junior coalition partner in British 
politics. Comparative research highlights competence, trust and leadership as three key 
challenges facing junior coalition parties. This article uses British Election Study data to 
show that the Liberal Democrats failed to convince the electorate on all three counts. The 
article also uses constituency-level data to examine the continued benefits of incumbency to 
the party and the impact of constituency campaigning. It finds that while the incumbency 
advantage remained for the Liberal Democrats, it was ultimately unable to mitigate the much 
larger national collapse.   
 
Highlights 
• The article tests expectations of junior coalition parties in the British context. 
• In doing so, it explains the Liberal Democrats’ 2015 general election collapse. 
• The party suffered from a lack of perceived competence and influence. 
• Voters losing trust in the party also cost them badly. 
• Leader Nick Clegg not the effective force he was in 2010. 
• Incumbency and campaigning still benefitted the party, but it was not enough. 
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Junior coalition parties in the British context: explaining 
the Liberal Democrat collapse at the 2015 general election 
Keywords: coalition; junior parties; valence politics; trust; incumbency; campaigning 
The Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2015 general election provides an opportunity to 
examine the only case in the post-war period of a national junior coalition partner in British 
politics. Comparative research highlights competence, trust and leadership as three key 
challenges facing junior coalition parties. This article uses British Election Study data to 
show that the Liberal Democrats failed to convince the electorate on all three counts. The 
article also uses constituency-level data to examine the continued benefits of incumbency to 
the party and the impact of constituency campaigning. It finds that while the incumbency 
advantage remained for the Liberal Democrats, it was ultimately unable to mitigate the much 
larger national collapse.   
 
1: Introduction 
At the 2010 British general election, the Liberal Democrats won 23 percent of the vote and 
57 seats. It was an electorally relevant share of seats that, following five days of negotiations, 
facilitated the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Despite arguably satisfying the 
office-seeking and policy-seeking criteria associated with coalition theory (Bale, 2012), the 
electoral prospects for the Liberal Democrats were bleak. The comparative literature on 
coalitions suggests that junior coalition parties tend to struggle in subsequent elections, and 
often face an uphill battle to get noticed by the electorate (Bolleyer, 2008; Dunphy and Bale, 
2011). The challenge for junior parties in coalition is to be competent in government, while 
maintaining party distinctiveness and popular leadership (Boston and Bullock, 2012; Paun 
and Munro, 2013). The case of the Liberal Democrats provides a unique opportunity to apply 
the comparative literature on junior coalition parties to the British context.  
Following heavy defeats in local, sub-national and national elections during the 2010 
parliament, the Liberal Democrats ran a highly defensive campaign ahead of the 2015 general 
election (Coetzee, 2015). It was unsuccessful. The Liberal Democrats won 7.9 percent of the 
vote and just 8 seats. In urban areas of northern England where they had built up support as 
the opposition to Labour in both local and Westminster elections, they were heavily beaten. 
Standing against the Conservatives in the south west of England, long-standing Liberal 
Democrat MPs were wiped out. In Scotland, along with Labour and the Conservatives, they 
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lost heavily to the Scottish National Party. Their efforts over a generation to win an 
electorally relevant share of seats have now collapsed and will take a monumental effort to 
rebuild.  
This article examines the reasons behind the Liberal Democrats’ collapse at the 2015 general 
election. The first section places the Liberal Democrats’ experience within the comparative 
literature on junior coalition parties, and outlines various explanations for their collapse. The 
second section analyses the Liberal Democrats’ particularly defensive campaign strategy in 
the 2015 general election, and examines the continued importance of incumbency to the 
party. It finds that while the incumbency effect still reaps benefits for the Liberal Democrats, 
it was not enough to withstand the fall in the national vote. The third section utilises data 
from the 2015 British Election Study to identify the individual reasons behind voting (or not) 
for the Liberal Democrats. It finds that the Liberal Democrats suffered badly due to a lack of 
perceived competence and influence, and badly lost the trust of their electorate.  
This article contributes not only to analysis of the Liberal Democrats, but also informs 
broader comparative literatures in two key respects. First, the 2010-2015 Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition was the first formal UK coalition in the post-war period, and 
examining the Liberal Democrats’ collapse in the 2015 general election informs broader 
analysis of junior parties in coalition. It explores whether junior parties must always suffer in 
coalition and the key tasks for them to overcome the challenges they face. Second, the article 
also examines the continuing success of constituency campaigning and incumbency 
strategies, shown to be important both to the Liberal Democrats but also to political parties 
more broadly (Fisher et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2015; Smith, 2013). How successful was this 
in the 2015 general election? This article examines these questions. 
 
2: The comparative perspective and electoral context 
The comparative literature on coalitions works from two main criteria. First, as parties are 
office-seeking, they should share as many of the spoils of office with as few parties as 
possible (Riker, 1962). When achieved, this is known as the minimum-winning coalition: a 
government that has an overall majority (winning) amongst the smaller number of parties 
(minimum). Second, parties are also policy-seeking, and look to form coalitions that broadly 
coincide with their principles and policy programmes (Axelrod, 1970). When achieved 
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alongside office-seeking priorities, the resulting government is the minimum-winning 
connected coalition.  
When the Liberal Democrats joined the Conservatives in coalition following the 2010 general 
election, they arguably satisfied these two main criteria (Bale, 2012). Needing 326 MPs to 
pass a Queen’s Speech and budget, Labour, with 258 MPs, could not even begin to think 
about governing without the support of the Liberal Democrats’ 57 MPs. Meanwhile, the 
Conservatives on their own with 307 MPs would have also found themselves short should a 
‘rainbow coalition’ of the centre-left (including the Liberal Democrats) try and defeat them. 
Even if the Conservatives could pass a Queen’s Speech, they would have been unable to 
govern comfortably. The subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, with a de-
facto majority of 80, was therefore the minimum-winning coalition. The Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition also arguably satisfied the policy-seeking requirement. The 
Liberal Democrats’ professionalisation in recent years has been accompanied by a more 
equidistant strategy that made a coalition with the Conservatives easier to navigate (Evans 
and Sanderson-Nash, 2011).  
Boston and Bullock (2012) note the tension that exists between governmental unity and party 
distinctiveness. This tension is particularly strong for junior parties in coalition without a 
history of government and coalitional compromise (Bolleyer, 2008), such as the Liberal 
Democrats. How did the Liberal Democrats perform in the 2010 parliament in this regard? 
Bennister and Heffernan (2015) argued that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was 
defined by consensus and compromise, with both sides operating from a position of mutual 
trust and respect. Despite doubts that it would be the case (Bale, 2012), the coalition lasted 
the full five years with remarkably few threats to its existence. What of party distinctiveness? 
An analysis of the 2010 coalition agreement between the two parties showed that both parties 
satisfied the main commitments of their manifesto, and the Liberal Democrats in particular 
were in a position to deliver much of the minutiae of their manifesto (Quinn et al., 2011). 
However in doing so, they gave ground to the Conservatives on the key issues of deficit 
reduction, tax, welfare, education, health, immigration and defence policy (Bale and Webb, 
2015). As Bale (2012: 328) wryly notes, the coalition agreement showed ‘what happens when 
vegetarians negotiate with carnivores’. 
The unity/distinctiveness dilemma invites a key question in relation to how junior parties are 
perceived in coalition: who do voters blame or credit for a coalition government’s 
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performance? Comparative evidence suggests that the lead governing party within a coalition, 
the ‘proposer’ of the coalition and the party with the ‘chief executive’, will bear most of the 
responsibility with voters for government performance (Duch et al., 2015; Fisher and Hobolt, 
2010). This suggests that in the UK context of 2010-2015, the Conservatives were more 
likely to be credited or blamed by the electorate than the Liberal Democrats for the 
government’s performance. Indeed, while the Liberal Democrats can claim successful 
implementation of some of their policies1, polling conducted in 2014 suggested that the 
Liberal Democrats’ key policy delivered in government, such as increasing the income tax 
threshold, was primarily associated by the voters with the Conservatives (Bennett, 2014). As 
Behr (2014) argues, ‘one difference between opposition and government for Liberal 
Democrats has been that, before coalition, no one noticed what they said; now, no one notices 
what they do’. In short, by prioritising coalition unity in the early years of the coalition, they 
sacrificed party distinctiveness (McEnhill, 2015). 
The Liberal Democrats’ lack of influence and distinctiveness suggests that their collapse can 
be explained by their voters feeling betrayed by the party (Cutts and Russell, 2015). More 
generally, Muller and Strom (1999) highlight the importance of maintaining party legitimacy, 
while Dunphy and Bale (2011) suggest that parties risk losing their identity in coalition with 
a larger party. Dommett (2013) suggests that a number of decisions by the Liberal Democrats 
created a schism between their rhetoric as an opposition party and their rhetoric in 
government, fostering a perception of distrust and betrayal.  
Junior coalition parties also face a number of other challenges. First, they must appear 
competent as a party in government (Muller and Strom, 1999). Clarke et al. (2009) argue that 
competence has increasingly shaped party competition in Britain. Green (2015) argues that 
the Liberal Democrats’ perceived competence on their key policy issues increased support for 
the party. However as this support has been gained based on difference from the two major 
parties (Green and Hobolt, 2008), the argument arises that they might have lost competence 
on key issues after aligning themselves too closely to the Conservatives in coalition. Indeed, 
on the three key valence issues ahead of the 2015 general election (the economy, immigration 
                                                 
1
 The threshold at which people start paying income tax was £7,475 in 2010-2011, and now stands at 
£10,600 (as of the financial year 2015-2016). The pupil premium ring-fences money in the education 
budget to go directly to the most deprived schools in the country. The coalition government abolished 
identity cards and child detention, radically reformed the pensions system, and implemented much of 
the Liberal Democrats’ environmental policy.  
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and health care), the Conservatives were more trusted than the Liberal Democrats (YouGov, 
2015). 
As well as perception of competence of parties’ key policy issues, the competence and 
popularity of party leaders is also argued to be important. Stokes (1992) argues that an 
assessment of a party’s competence is shaped ‘from its experience with the parties and the 
leaders, and the results they achieve, over time’. The assessment of a party leader is thus 
something to be considered alongside assessment of a broader political party (Clarke et al., 
2009; Whiteley et al., 2013). At the 2010 general election, party leader Nick Clegg was a 
source of electoral advantage for the Liberal Democrats (Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 2015). 
However, his popularity plunged throughout the 2010 parliament, and he was regarded as the 
least trusted leader of the then three main political parties ahead of the 2015 general election 
(Denver, 2015). 
Figure 1: Liberal Democrat Poll Ratings, 2010-2015 
 
Note: National opinion polling data between May 2010 and May 2015, taken from 
Mark Pack’s (2015) national opinion polling database.2 
The Liberal Democrats’ poll rating dipped quickly and then continually fell during the 2010 
parliament (see Figure 1), and the 2015 general election saw the near-wipeout of Liberal 
Democrat MPs. They received just 7.9 percent of the vote, a drop of 15.2 percentage points 
on their performance in 2010. They returned just 8 MPs, compared with 57 MPs in 2010. Of 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that there was a major polling error over the 2010 parliament. While the estimates 
for the Liberal Democrats were broadly correct, we do not know that this was correct throughout the 
entire parliament.  
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the 49 seats lost, 28 were lost to the Conservatives, 12 to Labour and 9 to the Scottish 
National Party. They made no gains, and their vote share fell in every constituency across the 
country. Whilst in 2010 the Liberal Democrats did not lose a single deposit3, in 2015 they lost 
340 deposits, costing them £170,000. The next section explains the constituency factors 
behind the party’s collapse. 
 
3: Liberal Democrat local performance 
This section examines the locally targeted strategy of the Liberal Democrat campaign. 
Despite the fall in the party’s national support, various academic forecasting models 
predicted that the party would do better than a uniform national swing based on opinion polls 
would suggest (Monk and Lambert, 2015). This was based on the party’s ability to target 
seats through locally focused campaigns (Cutts, 2014; Fieldhouse et al., 2006). Local 
campaigning is no longer an irrelevant sideshow (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988) to the national 
campaign, but a way in which political parties in the UK and beyond can alter local results 
(Jacobson, 2006; Pattie and Johnston, 2009; Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). Such a targeted 
strategy was the only realistic option for the party. Many of the Liberal Democrats’ MPs had 
been respected community representatives and locally popular for a long period of time 
(Smith, 2013), and their local electoral and organisational strength in these constituencies 
post-2010 suggested that they might be able to mitigate the effects of a collapse in their 
national vote share (Johnson, 2014). As the Liberal Democrats’ election strategist Ryan 
Coetzee (2015) has outlined, the party embarked on a targeted consolidation strategy, 
focusing almost entirely on seats where they had the incumbent MP.   
How defensive was the Liberal Democrat campaign in the 2015 general election? One 
method of answering this question is to examine the visits made by party leaders to 
constituencies. During election campaigns party leaders tour the country, visiting 
constituencies and candidates. Political parties ‘weaponise’ their leaders at the local level, 
bringing the national campaign if not on to people’s doorsteps, then on to the streets that 
surround them. Leader Nick Clegg, accompanied by the media, spent the weeks of the 
campaign touring the country in his battle bus (accidentally killing a pigeon along the way), 
                                                 
3
 Candidates lose their deposit (£500) when they win less than five per cent of the vote in a 
constituency election.  
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donning hard hats and high-vis jackets as the occasion demanded. The bus broke down on 
more than one occasion and the occupants (including a heavy Press contingent) headed off to 
the local pub. Such visits made by party leaders can have a significant impact on party vote 
share at the local level (Carty and Eagles, 2005; Holbrook, 2002), with Nick Clegg’s visits 
during the 2010 general election campaign boosting the Liberal Democrats’ vote share on 
average by 1.5 percentage points (Middleton, 2015). 
 
Table 1 identifies the number of constituencies visited by the three main party leaders during 
the 2015 general election campaign, and what percentage were to seats held by their own 
party. By isolating the incumbency of the constituencies visited, it is possible to identify 
expansionist visits (to seats held by other parties) and defensive visits (to seats already held). 
The evidence from Table 1 confirms that Nick Clegg ran the most defensive visit strategy of 
all three party leaders, with almost three quarters of his visits being to seats held by the 
Liberal Democrats. In the final three days of campaigning alone (4-6th May), all bar one of 
the 15 constituencies he visited were being defended by his own party. Contrast this to 2010, 
when just 23.9 percent of his total number of visits were to seats his party already held 
(Middleton, 2015).  
As indicated by Nick Clegg’s visits to constituencies the party already held, the Liberal 
Democrats were running a defensive electoral strategy. However, to understand the impact 
that this defensive strategy had on local results, we must consider the local electoral contexts 
and explore the types of seats where the Liberal Democrats lost votes. Table 2 breaks down 
the falls in the party’s vote share according to whether the Liberal Democrats held the seat or 
were the second-placed party. In seats held by the Liberal Democrats, their vote share 
Table 1: Visits by party leaders during the 2015 short campaign 
 
 
 Number of 
constituencies visited 
Visits in 2015 to constituencies 
held by their own party (%) 
Change from 
2010 (%) 
 
David 
Cameron 
69 56.5 +49.2  
Ed 
Miliband 
51 33.3 -53.8  
Nick Clegg 44 70.4 + 46.5  
 
Source: Leadership visits to constituencies between 30 March 2015 and 6 May 2015. Data 
from 2010 retrieved from Middleton (2015). 
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dropped on average three percentage points less than where they were placed second, 
although this was still insufficient to retain 49 of their seats. 
N.B: Safe/marginal is classified according to the percentage majority of the constituency 
going into the 2015 election. Marginal seats have a majority of ≤ 9.99 percentage points, safe 
seats ≥ 10.00 points. For a discussion of the appropriateness of this measure see Cornford 
and Dorling (1997). 
To examine these seats in more detail, Table 2 also identifies the vulnerability of the 
constituency (Jacobson 1987) by isolating safe and marginal constituencies. Once these two 
incumbency scenarios are disaggregated according to whether the seat was marginal or safe, 
the falls in vote share take on an interesting pattern. In the constituencies that the party 
already held, they did worse in those that were safe. The largest drop in a safe Liberal 
Democrat-held constituency came in Bristol West, where the incumbent Stephen Williams 
saw a drop in his vote of 29.2 percentage points, losing his seat and coming third. However, 
the reverse is true for the seats in which the party were second, with the Liberal Democrat 
vote share falling on average 4.7 percentage points more in marginal seats where they were in 
second place. This raises the possibility that the party may have been punished by voters 
according to their distance to power: the party’s vote share fell less where they were more 
vulnerable (both in their marginal seats or a distantly-placed second), yet in seats where they 
were close to winning (those they held safely or where their second-placed challenger stood a 
reasonable chance) the drop in their vote was greater.  
                                                 
4
 Gordon was the only constituency where the Scottish National Party was in second place prior to the 
2015 election. Overall, in seats where the SNP gained from the Liberal Democrats, their vote share 
fell on average by 10.1 percentage points. 
Table 2: Liberal Democrat vote share change according to incumbency and marginality 
 
 Percentage point change 2010-2015 
Overall -15.1 
Liberal Democrat held -15.7 
Marginal -15.0 
Safe -16.3 
Liberal Democrat challenger -18.7 
Marginal -22.7 
Safe -18.0 
Liberal Democrat held, Conservative challenger -16.4 
Liberal Democrat held, Labour challenger -15.0 
Liberal Democrat held, SNP challenger  -3.34 
Seats won in 2005 but lost in 2010 -21.7 
  
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset. 
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As Table 2 demonstrates, the Liberal Democrats did particularly badly in seats where their 
challengers were the Conservatives. It would appear that the ‘Black Widow Effect’ for the 
junior coalition partner came true (Bale, 2012). Research by Green and Prosser (2015) shows 
that Labour were the largest beneficiary of the Liberal Democrat collapse in terms of votes 
across all constituencies in Britain, but that this predominantly served to take votes away 
from the Liberal Democrats in seats where they were being challenged by the Conservatives. 
Paradoxically, Labour’s gain in Liberal Democrat votes was the Conservatives’ gain in 
Liberal Democrat seats. Perhaps unsurprisingly the Liberal Democrats did particularly badly 
in the 13 seats they won in the 2005 general election but lost in the 2010 election, with the 
party’s vote share in these seats dropping by an average of 21.7 percentage points. 
Considering that the party had lost these seats when they were relatively popular, rebuilding 
the party vote share in these seats in the post-coalition environment seems to have been a tall 
order.  
Examinations of candidate incumbency have identified two key points at which it impacts 
party electoral performance: when an MP retires and when an MP defends their first election 
as the incumbent (Norris et al., 1992). In constituencies where a sitting MP retires, their 
party’s vote share performs comparatively worse than in other constituencies where the party 
is standing as either incumbent or challenger. This phenomenon is known as the retirement 
slump (Cain et al., 1987) and is attributed to the loss of the personal vote cultivated by the 
retiring MP over the course of their career. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, whose 
incumbency advantage over both the Conservatives and Labour is comparatively large 
(Smith, 2013), the loss of an incumbent MP through retirement is likely to hit the party’s 
local vote share particularly hard. To examine whether MP retirement impacted Liberal 
Democrat local performance in 2015, Table 3 compares vote share in seats where the 
incumbent Liberal Democrat MP retired with seats where the incumbent Liberal Democrat 
MP fought again. A clear and significant difference can be found, with Liberal Democrat vote 
share falling by an average of 21.8 percentage points in seats where the sitting MP retired, 
compared with a fall of 14.3 percentage points where the sitting MP remained.  This shows a 
clear difference: the party suffered particularly heavily where the personal vote of the retiring 
MP was lost, performing 7.5 percentage points worse on average. 
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Table 3: Liberal Democrat vote share change for retiring MPs and first time MPs.  
 
 % Change 2010-2015 
Retiring  
MP stood down (11) -21.8 
MP did not stand down (46) -14.3 
     Independent samples T-test 3.386** 
First-time incumbency  
First-time incumbent MP (10) -10.9 
MP elected before 2010   (36) -16.7 
     Independent samples T-test -2.084* 
 
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset. 
NB: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
This is not to suggest that Liberal Democrat MPs who retired would have won had they 
remained a candidate (the sheer scale of defeat for many Liberal Democrat MPs suggests that 
only Don Foster in Bath and Sir Menzies Campbell in Fife North East presented any realistic 
possibility). However, in some seats the damage might have been countered enough by an 
incumbent MP seeking re-election to keep the seats in Liberal Democrat hands. Perhaps more 
importantly, the eight Liberal Democrat seats that the party retained might have changed 
hands had their candidates retired. Five of the remaining eight Liberal Democrat MPs’ 
majorities are within the 7.5 per cent average drop; of the other three, both Mark Williams’ 
majority in Ceredigion and Norman Lamb’s majority in Norfolk North are only 8.2 
percentage points.5 On this basis, the incumbency factor was not strong enough to stop the 
Liberal Democrats losing the majority of their seats, but appears strong enough to have 
stopped them losing even more.  
The second point at which constituency incumbency impacts party performance is the 
‘sophomore surge’ observed in incumbents defending their first election (Gelman and King, 
1990). These candidates typically do better than both the party’s longer-serving MPs and 
their yet-to-be-elected candidates; they spend their first term building and consolidating their 
personal vote in their constituency, with the pay-off at their first election as the incumbent. In 
the case of the Liberal Democrats, first time incumbents tend to do particularly well (Cutts, 
2012) compared to their other candidates. This was reflected in 2015, as Table 3 indicates, 
the Liberal Democrats’ ten first-time incumbents performed better (or less worse) than their 
longer serving counterparts. Where an MP was fighting their first election as the incumbent, 
                                                 
5
 The remaining Liberal Democrat MP, Tim Farron, has a majority of 18.3 percentage points in 
Westmoreland and Lonsdale. 
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the Liberal Democrat vote share fell by an average of 10.9 percentage points, compared to an 
average of 16.7 points for the party’s MPs elected before 2010. Yet all first-time Liberal 
Democrat MPs who stood in 2015 lost their seat; the sophomore surge was insufficient to 
protect them. This failure of what is generally seen as a beneficial surge to the vote can be 
explained by looking at the types of constituencies that these first-time MPs were defending. 
All, bar one (Cambridge, where Julian Huppert was defending a 13.2 percentage point 
majority), were marginal. The first time incumbents, while insulated from the severity of the 
drop in the Liberal Democrat vote share, suffered more proportionally in their marginal 
constituencies than their longer-standing colleagues. 
 
Table 4 shows the electoral bonus for Liberal Democrat first-time incumbent MPs compared 
with all Liberal Democrat candidates, and retiring candidates for the party, and compares this 
with the bonus for first-time incumbent MPs in the Conservative and Labour parties. The 
Liberal Democrats’ first-time incumbency bonus over all the party’s candidates and also 
candidates where the Liberal Democrat MP had retired remains strong, with an advantage of 
5.8 and 10.9 percentage points respectively. In short, the Liberal Democrats’ first-time 
incumbency bonus was strong, and particularly strong relative to other parties. Of course, the 
Liberal Democrats’ problem at the next election is that they currently have no first-time 
incumbents. For the Liberal Democrats’ future electoral prospects, it would appear vital that 
their eight remaining incumbent MPs stand as candidates at the next general election to avoid 
the retirement slump. The Liberal Democrats’ experience suggests that incumbency remains 
one source of electoral advantage for political parties, but as Smith (2013) concludes, its 
effect should not be exaggerated. It is one factor of many in determining electoral advantage 
or disadvantage, and in the Liberal Democrats’ case was overwhelmed by national factors. 
The next section examines such factors in more detail.  
 
Table 4: Difference between first-time incumbent MPs and other seats, 2015 general 
election 
 Liberal Democrat 
(%) 
Conservative 
(%) 
Labour 
(%) 
First-time incumbent bonus over all 
candidates 
+ 5.8 + 3.2 +/- 0 
First-time incumbents bonus over 
retiring MPs 
+ 10.9 + 2.8 + 0.3 
 
Source: 2015 British Election Study Constituency Dataset.  
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4: Individual predictors of Liberal Democrat support 
The previous section used aggregate level data to examine the constituency campaigning 
strategy and incumbency benefits for the Liberal Democrats. While it highlights the 
continued importance of local campaigning and incumbency for the party, it does not explain 
the individual reasons behind the Liberal Democrats’ collapse. This section addresses those, 
examining the explanations for challenges outlined for junior coalition parties in the 
comparative literature, using data from the pre- and post-election waves of the 2015 British 
Election Study to produce a binary logistic regression model. The dependent variable is a 
measure asking whether or not respondents voted Liberal Democrat in the 2015 general 
election. Given the large sample size of the 2015 British Election Study (N = 30027), it is 
possible to focus on a specific subset of cases and still have a large sample. This study 
focuses solely on those respondents that voted Liberal Democrat in the 2010 general election, 
and the reasons behind their support (or lack of it) for the party in the 2015 general election. 
This is done for two reasons. First, the sheer scale of the Liberal Democrats’ defeat suggests 
that they failed to pick up many new voters. Indeed, their vote share did not increase in a 
single constituency. Second, explaining the party’s collapse should examine why people 
stopped voting for the party, as opposed to looking at those people who did not vote for the 
party more broadly. Extensive analysis of this broader question has been conducted before 
(see Cutts, 2012), and understanding why parties lose support is an important question to be 
addressed (Johnston and Pattie, 2011). The scale of the 2015 British Election Study sample 
allows much more targeted analysis, still leaving a sample size of 2167 that can be included 
in the regression.  
As examined in the comparative section, there are a range of explanations as to why junior 
coalition parties struggle in elections. Analysis of valence issue politics suggests that junior 
coalition partners find it hard to convince supporters of their influence in coalition (Duch et 
al., 2015; Dunphy and Bale, 2011; Muller and Strom, 1999). In this context, the 
Conservatives’ dominance within the coalition suggests that the Liberal Democrats may not 
have appeared a credible governing party with their electorate. The model tests this in three 
different ways. First, the model incorporates a binary variable measuring whether (1) or not 
(0) an individual respondent thought that a party other than a Liberal Democrats were best on 
the most important issue to them. The valence model suggests that if voters feel that a party 
other than the Liberal Democrats to be the best on their most important issue, then they will 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
13 
 
be less likely to vote for them. Second, the model includes a variable asking whether 
respondents felt the economy was getting better or worse. If the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 
voters accorded them credit for being in government, they should be more likely to support 
them if they felt the economy was improving. Third, the model includes a similar variable 
asking whether respondents felt that the education system was getting better or worse. 
Throughout the parliament, the Liberal Democrats stressed their positive influences on 
education policy: if their voters give them credit for this, they should be more likely to have 
supported them in 2015.  
The Liberal Democrats’ difficulty in convincing supporters of their influence within the 
coalition might have fostered a sense of betrayal amongst their supporters (Cutts and Russell, 
2015; Dommett, 2013). To measure perception of betrayal, the model makes use of the 
variable ‘anger at the Liberal Democrats’. Surveys of political attitudes increasingly include 
questions on emotions in relation to political action. In particular, anger is a decisive negative 
emotion (Lockerbie, 1993) and arises when an external actor can be blamed (Wagner, 2014). 
The sheer scale of the local, sub-national and national electoral collapse suggests an 
attribution of responsibility to the Liberal Democrats by their former supporters, and anger as 
an emotional response to betrayal is argued here to be the most appropriate variable to 
account for any breakdown in trust in the Liberal Democrats. As Cutts and Russell (2015: 80) 
argue, ‘those voters… who had supported the Liberal Democrats… to keep the Conservatives 
out were left angry and betrayed’. It is expected that anger with the Liberal Democrats, coded 
(1), to be a significant and negative predictor of voting Liberal Democrat at the 2015 general 
election.   
The importance of party leadership to a party’s electoral fortunes has also been widely noted 
(Clarke et al., 2009; Stokes, 1992). Positive attitudes to Nick Clegg were a big indicator of 
support for the Liberal Democrats at the 2010 general election (Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 
2015). However, he was perceived by the electorate to be the most incompetent of the three 
main leaders for most of the 2010 parliament (Denver, 2015). The model incorporates 
attitudes to party leaders, measured on a 0-10 thermometer scale. Whether respondents liked 
or disliked Nick Clegg is included in the model, as is the same measure for David Cameron 
and Ed Miliband. 
Other factors highlighted as indicating levels of support for political parties are also included 
in the model. Partisan identification has previously been shown to be a key indicator of 
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support (or lack of it) for political parties. Previous research has shown that if people develop 
an attachment to a party, they are more likely to support it (Holmberg, 2003).  Respondents to 
the British Election Study were asked which political party, if any, they identify with. It is 
expected that those who identify with the Liberal Democrats, coded as (1), to be more likely 
to have supported the party at the 2015 general election.  
The previous section demonstrated the continued importance of incumbency to the Liberal 
Democrats, so the model controls for whether or not the respondent was based in a 
constituency with a Liberal Democrat MP. Given the importance of local campaigning to the 
party (Cutts, 2014), the model also controls for whether or not a respondent recalls being 
contacted by the Liberal Democrats during the election campaign.  
The model also accounts for attitudes on and perceptions of areas of British politics that 
might indicate support for the Liberal Democrats. Whether or not respondents think 
coalitions (1) are more effective than single-party government (0) is included. Given that the 
Liberal Democrats’ only realistic hope of national office is in coalition with a major party, it 
is expected that support for coalitions as an effective form of government would make people 
more likely to support the Liberal Democrats. However, the strong contextual nature of local 
support for the Liberal Democrats suggests that support for coalitions might not play a 
significant part.  
Given the Liberal Democrats’ historical ability to win support based on their policy stance 
(Green, 2015), the model also includes key policy areas asked in the British Election Study 
that might indicate support for the party. First, given the prominence of debate surrounding 
the European Union in British politics between 2010 and 2015, and the Liberal Democrats’ 
strong support of the European Union (Goes, 2015), voting intention (1 = remain, 0 = leave) 
in a referendum on the European Union is included in the model. Second, the model also 
includes a variable to test the effect of the Liberal Democrats’ policy shift on tuition fees. 
Prior to the 2010 general election, the Liberal  Democrats  made  the  most  of  a  National  
Union  of  Students  campaign  to  abolish tuition  fees.  Many  of  their  parliamentary 
candidates,  including  party  leader  Nick  Clegg, proudly  held  a  card  in  front  of  the  
cameras  pledging  to  abolish  tuition  fees.  Whatever its immediate electoral benefit, it was 
fundamentally naïve. The Conservatives’ intention was always to implement the 
recommendations of the Browne review (increasing tuition fees to £9,000), and the Liberal 
Democrats went back on their promise.  However, a number of Liberal Democrat MPs 
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rebelled and voted against the move. The model questions whether or not a rebelling MP (1) 
was more successful in holding on to Liberal Democrat voters than a non-rebelling MP (0). 
There is debate within the academic literature as to the effect of tuition fees on the Liberal 
Democrats’ support (Curtice, 2015a; Cutts and Russell, 2015). Comparative evidence 
suggests that while voters do hold their MPs accountable, it is general, and MPs tend not to 
be rewarded for rebellion on a ‘particularly salient single issue’ (Vivyan and Wagner, 2012: 
259). Whether or not rebelling MPs performed better will contribute further to this 
discussion. Finally, the model includes the respondent’s age, sex, and whether or not they 
have a degree as socio-demographic control variables.  
Table 5 shows the results of a logistic regression model predicting support for the Liberal 
Democrats in the 2015 general election amongst respondents who supported the party in the 
2010 general election.6 Together the overall model worked well, with a pseudo R-square of 
0.51. Firstly, the argument that the Liberal Democrats’ collapse can be explained due to a 
perceived lack of competence is supported. Those that felt a party other than the Liberal 
Democrats were the best on the most important issue in British politics to them were less 
likely to support the party. The very small odds ratio highlights the strength of this negativity. 
The problems that the party had to be noticed in coalition appear to have done the party great 
damage in the 2015 general election. Alongside this, whether or not respondents felt that the 
economy or the education system got better under the coalition government made them no 
more likely to vote Liberal Democrat in 2015. This supports comparative arguments that 
junior coalition parties struggle to have influence in government (Duch et al., 2015; Dunphy 
and Bale, 2011; Muller and Strom, 1999).  
  
                                                 
6
 Results are presented using odds ratios, which predict the probability of an event occurring. Higher 
than 1 and the effect is positive. Lower than 1 and the effect is negative. The greater the distance from 
1 (either way), the greater the effect of the independent variable.  
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Table 5: Logistic regression detailing predictors of 2015 Liberal Democrat support 
 Odds ratio 
Competence and trust 
 
Other parties best on most important issue 0.21*** 
The economy is improving 1.01 
Education system is improving 1.11 
Nick Clegg 1.22*** 
David Cameron 0.96 
Ed Miliband 0.93** 
Angry with the Liberal Democrats 0.35*** 
Party identification, incumbency and campaigning 
 
Identifies with the Liberal Democrats 3.45*** 
Liberal Democrat incumbent 6.68*** 
Liberal Democrat contact before election 3.07*** 
Attitudes and perceptions  
Coalitions more effective than single-party govt 1.11 
Support Britain’s membership of the EU 1.68** 
Liberal Democrat MP rebelled on tuition fees 0.68 
Socio-demographic factors  
Age 1.02*** 
Sex 0.90 
Degree 1.00 
Constant 0.02*** 
 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = 0.51 
-2 Log Likelihood = 1616.779 
 
Source: 2015 British Election Study (pre- and post-election waves).  
N = 2167 (Sample of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters). 
Bold figures denote significant effects: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Dependent variable: Voted Liberal Democrat in 2015 general election. 
 
Those who liked then Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg were more likely to support the 
Liberal Democrats; however the odds ratio’s proximity to one suggests that his positive 
impact was much smaller than in 2010 (Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 2015). Attitudes to David 
Cameron had no significant effect on Liberal Democrat support, while those 2010 Liberal 
Democrat voters who liked Ed Miliband were less likely to support the Liberal Democrats at 
the 2015 general election. 
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The explanation that the Liberal Democrats lost support due a perception of betrayal is also 
strongly supported. Those who were angry with the Liberal Democrats were less likely to 
vote for them in the 2015 general election. Again, the small odds ratio highlights the strength 
of this negativity. The distrust that once benefitted the Liberal Democrats at the expense of 
the Labour and Conservative parties has now engulfed them too. While they can claim a 
series of individual policy success and limitations on their Conservative coalition partners, 
they ultimately failed to distinguish themselves as the junior coalition partner. As Dommett 
(2013) argues, the effort to rebuild trust with voters will be a long and painful process. 
The key lessons from the comparative literature on junior coalition parties is that they must 
appear competent and influential in government, maintain trust with their supporters and 
make the most of their leadership (Duch et al., 2015; Dunphy and Bale, 2011; Paun and 
Munro, 2013). On all three issues, the Liberal Democrats were unable to convince the 
electorate. Their perceived incompetence and lack of influence cost them heavily, those who 
were angry with the party deserted them and Nick Clegg was not the overwhelmingly 
positive contributor to Liberal Democrat support that he was in 2010. Together, these three 
issues did great damage to the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 general election.  
What was the effect of other explanations of support for political parties? Party identification 
continues to be a strong indicator of party support. Those who identified with the Liberal 
Democrats were more likely to vote for the party in 2015. This was a strong indicator of 
Liberal Democrat support. There were statistically significant predictors relating to the 2010-
2015 parliament. As expected, being in a Liberal Democrat incumbent constituency made a 
respondent more likely to support the Liberal Democrats in 2015. Respondents who recalled 
being contacted by the Liberal Democrats during the four weeks prior to the 2015 general 
election were also more likely to support the party.7 With strong respective odds ratios, 
incumbency and campaigning continues to benefit the party.  
Attitudes to and perceptions of policies also had a mixed effect on support for the Liberal 
Democrats. Those who would vote to stay in the European Union were also more likely to 
support the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 general election. However, whether or not a 
respondent preferred coalitions to single-party government made no difference. On the issue 
of tuition fees, if a respondent lived in a constituency with a Liberal Democrat MP that 
                                                 
7
 It was suggested that we compared this effect with an earlier pre-election contact variable. This was 
done, but it did not change the results, and heavily reduced the number of respondents, so the model 
stands with the post-election variable.  
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rebelled on tuition fees they were no more likely to support the party at the general election. 
Those MPs who rebelled on tuition fees do not appear to have reaped any electoral reward. 
While this does not settle the debate about the effect of tuition fees on the party more broadly 
(see Curtice, 2015a; Cutts and Russell, 2015), it supports evidence that rebelling on a single 
salient issue does not lead to subsequent electoral reward (Vivyan and Wagner, 2012). 
Finally, older respondents were more likely than younger respondents to support the Liberal 
Democrats. Whether a respondent was male or female made no difference, nor did whether or 
not they had a degree. In short, the Liberal Democrats failed to convince the electorate on the 
key issues of competence, distinctiveness and leadership.  
 
5: Conclusion 
The Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2015 general election provides an opportunity to 
examine the only case in the post-war period of a national junior coalition partner in British 
politics. The comparative literature on coalitions suggested that they faced a series of 
challenges: they needed to appear competent in government; they needed to make a positive 
and distinctive contribution to the country that was recognised by the electorate; and they 
needed to make the most of political leadership to promote their participation in coalition. 
Most evidence suggests that junior coalition parties struggle to overcome these challenges, 
although some positive examples exist (Bale, 2012; Paun and Munro, 2013). Alongside this, 
the Liberal Democrats’ have enjoyed particular electoral success due to incumbency and 
constituency campaigning (Cutts, 2014; Smith, 2013). The 2015 general election provided the 
party with a huge, uphill challenge. Due to the fall in their national popularity, the party 
embarked on a highly defensive strategy, focusing almost entirely on their incumbent seats.  
Using aggregate-level and individual-level data, this article has examined the Liberal 
Democrats’ success in combatting the challenges outlined above. At the aggregate level, the 
article finds that incumbency was unable to stem the far greater national tides hitting Liberal 
Democrat support. The first-time incumbency ‘sophomore’ bonus remained, and was stronger 
for the Liberal Democrats than the Conservative and Labour parties, but was also unable to 
protect them. While their first-time incumbent MPs were able to build up levels of support in 
their first five years in office, they lacked the time to build up substantial enough majorities 
to withstand the heavy fall in national vote share. However, without the incumbency factor 
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the return of seats might have been even worse. The party did particularly badly where their 
MPs had stepped down. Future research should continue to examine the positive impact of 
incumbency for political parties. For the Liberal Democrats, it appears vital that their current 
small crop of MPs stay to contest their seats at the next general election.    
Individual level analysis shows that the main challenges set out for the Liberal Democrats as 
a junior coalition party ultimately defeated them. First, they were unable to convince their 
2010 voters that they were a credible coalition partner that would be competent in 
government. Second, they failed to make a contribution to government so distinctive from 
their Conservative partners that cut through to their electorate, and perception of betrayal as a 
consequence cost them badly. Third, their reliance on then leader Nick Clegg was a huge 
boost for the Liberal Democrats in 2010, but he was unable to have such a strong positive 
effect in 2015. Together, these three factors provide key explanations of the Liberal 
Democrats’ collapse in the 2015 general election.  
The continuing likelihood of hung parliaments following future general elections in Britain 
(Curtice, 2015b) means that co-operation between political parties is not off the table, and the 
Liberal Democrats’ experience is a valuable lesson for analysis both of British politics and 
more comparative work on coalitions. In future, junior coalition parties in Britain must find a 
way to balance unity within coalition alongside trust and competence with the electorate. In 
many respects, the Liberal Democrats were well prepared for coalition. They produced 
alongside the Conservatives a detailed and binding coalition agreement, held important 
cabinet posts and implemented much of their manifesto. However, they ultimately failed to 
convince the electorate of their influence and their experience in government stands as a 
monumental electoral failure. Their local, sub-national and now national electoral base has 
been fundamentally weakened, and it will take a monumental effort to rebuild it.   
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